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The gross forcign financing requirements for all  ments in the last part of the 1990s result mnainly
of Sub-Saharan Africat  --  belore debt relief of  from dhe  continuallv wideninlg  trade deficit.
any kind or thc accumulation of newv  arrears --
are projected to average about $28 billion a year  Debt service obligations - before resched-
(in nominal prices) between 1991 and 2000, or  uling and before the accumulation of any addi-
about $50 per capita annually.  Thesc figures  tional arrears --  comprise more than half of the
comparc with estimatcd gross tinancing of $27-  gross extcrnal financing requirements in the first
$28 billion in 1988 and S24-$25  billion in 1982.  half of the 1990s, but fall to about 40 percent by
This is equivalent to only about 12 to 14 percent  the end of the decade.  Debt scrvice obligations
of total capital flo\ws  to the developing world in  were equivalent to about three-fourths of the
1988.  gross external financing requirements in 1988
but only about a third in 1982.
The annual levels decline in mid-decade to
about $26-$27 billion a year but rise to more  The importance of dCbt service in total
than $30 billion by 2000.  This variation in dte  requirements reveals that the extemal financing
trend reflects combined movements in the  problem in Africa is much more than a structural
balance of trade in goods and services (excluding  imbalance of imports and exports.  Debt relief
interest), debt service obligations, targets for  measures will be an important source of finane-
increase- in international reserves, and private  ing.
transfers.  High levels in the early years are the
result of heavy debt service obligations; the later  For low-income countries, however, debt
decline in these obligations helps reduce require-  relief alone will not solve their financing prob-
ments mid-decadc.  Debt service obligations rise  lem because their trade balance will continue to
in 1991-93 on nonconcessional debt contracted  deteriorate.  But for most middle-income coun-
in the last half of the 1980s but decline in 1994-  tries where thc trade balance is positive. debt
97 and stabilize after that. The rising require-  relief may have a much more decided impact.
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The purpose of this paper is to discuss  the magnitude of exterr3l resources that Sub-Saharan
Africa may require during the 1990s. There can be no firm projections because requirements are
affected both  by the growth and efficiency targets chosen and by a wide range of factors, both
intemal and external to Sub-Saharan Africa,  which often interact to reinforce or offset one another.
However, the specific projections provided by this paper offer a  point of departure  for further
discussions.  To  facilitate such discussions, this paper also provides a qualitative framework for
considering how various factors affect resource requirements.
To achieve the GDP growth target of 5 percent a year by 2000 proposed in Sub-Saharan
Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth  the quantitative scenario in this paper shows that Sub-
Saharan Africa could require gross external capital of $28-29  billion a year, on average, for the period
1991-2000  (or $21 bil  in a year in constant 1988 dollars,  which compares to an actual gross external
capital inflow of about $28 billion in 1988). While this amount is large for Sub-Saharan Africa, it is
relatively small as a share of total capital flows  to the developing world (12-14 percent in 1988). As
in the past, this amount can be financed by a combination of new money and debt relief (including
arrears).  Roughly, about half the gross capital inflows would finance net imports of goods and
services  (other than interest), needed for current and future growth, and the other half would finance
debt service payments on borrowing that financed past expenditures.
Annual requirements would  be high initially  to cope with debt obligations, lower in the middle
years of the decade, and higher at the end as debt servicing  rises and the trade deficit continues to
widen.  Gross external financing at this level would be roughly equal to 15 percent of Sub-Saharan
GNP,  compared to  gross national savings of  13 percent.  Achieving this scenario will requireappropriate  domestic policy reforms, especially those  designed to  raise investment to  a  level
equivalent to 25 percent of GDP, and to achieve a dramatic improvement in the efficiency  of capital.
The conceptual framework used in this paper for estimating external resource requirements
is based essentially on the two-gap model, in which the gap between domestic savings and gross
investment must equal the difference between imports and exports, which is financed by external
capital  or  foreign savings.  In  the  formulation of  the  two-gap model  used in  this paper,  the
relationship between imports and targeted output determines the required level of imports of goods
and non factor services,  An assumed export growth rate determines the export level.  Thus, the
external financing  gap is largely a function of the target (growth of GDP) and two assumptions that
together  lead  to  the  export-import (X-M)  gap,  plus projected debt  service obligations.  The
investment-savings  (I-S) gap is derived from the X-M gap. The assumed relationship between output
growth and investment indicates the level of new annual investment required to att-in  the target
GDP growth rate.  Domestic savings  are calculated as a residual to make the I-S gap equal to the X-
M gap.
Behind this simple formulation lies a complex set of economic, structural and behavioral
relationships.  These projections are based on specific assumptions about key variables.  Because
these variables can be  changed through specific policy actions, assumptions about policies help
determine the structural economic changes and external resources needed to achieve certain targets.
But there is no explicit formulation in the projections model linking the value of key variables to
specific policy reforms.  Instead, these linkages are discussed  qualitatively.
2To provide a context for the discussions,  the paper starts with a section on the economic
history and evolution of Sub-Saharan Africa.  A section on savings, investment and efficiency of
capital  follows dealing with  the  feasibility of  achieving the desired growth targets, the  policy
instruments av3ilable to attain them, and the policy reforms that African countries should implement
to boost the demand for investment as well as private and public savings. The final section analyses
the external resource requirements, as projected by the model, and discusses  implications for other
relhted economic and financial variables. A detailed description of the assumptions and the model
is annexed to the paper.
3Economic  change  and evolution
The last thirft veam
About  thirty  years  ago  colonialism  was  ending  in Africa.  African  leaders  were  optimistic  about
their political,  economical  and social future, and the donor community,  sharing this optimism,
contributed  substantial  resources.
Resources  were channeled  substantially  toward  industrialization.  Agriculture  took second
place,  basically  supplying  raw  matcria!s  and providing  tax revenues.  In addition,  the government  paid'
a lot of attention to the social  sector and infrastructure.  The development  strategy,  fully  supported
by donors, entailed a dominant  role for the government,  which  adopted multi-year  plans,  created
public  enterprises,  set prices,  controlled  trade and directly  allocated  credit and foreign  exchange.
This strategy  appeared  to pay  off at first. GDP grew  at 5.9 percent a year during 1965-73,
about the same rate as for other developing  countries. Strong  export demand  and high  investment,
financed from export eamings, commercial  borrowing  and aid, boosted the GDP growth rate.
However,  with time,  the developing  strategy  showed  its first failures,  as countries  begun to stumble
after the first  oil shock. 1 By the middle  of the 1970s  Africa's  performance  started to lag behind  that
of other developing  countries. By  the 1980s  output began  to decline.  As the crisis  deepened,  African
I  The biggest  increases  in oii prices,  here referred to as oil shocks,  took place  in 1973-74  and
1979-80,  and are the basis  for the periods  selected  to average  data.
4countries started reforms programs, and GDP growth began to recover in the second half of the
1980s,  but growth rates have remained below those ir. other developing countries except in 1989.
In 1965 Sub-Saharan Africa and Spain had about the same size economy (US$27 and 24
biilions respectively); 23 years later, Spain's US$ 340 billion output was more than double that of
Sub-Saharan Africa's, with only 8 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's population and only 2 percent of
its land mass. Spain graduated from the ranks of developing  countries.  Sub-Saharan Africa became
instead the Third World of the Third World.
Table 1  Growth  of GDP, 1967-89
(percent per year)
1967-73  1974-80 1981-84 1985-87  1988  1989
Sub-Saharan Africa  7.0  2.7  -1.1  2.6  2.5  3.6
less Nigeria  4.4  2.0  1.9  3.1  1.5  2.2
Non-African developing countries  6.5  5.4  3.5  5.4  5.8  3.4
Source: World Bank data files
Performance has varied greatly from country to country. Average annual GDP growth during
1961-87 ranged from 8.3 percent  for Botswana to -2.2 percent  for Uganda.  Oil exports greatly
affected performance, with oil exporters doing well  or badly  according to fluctuations  in the oil prices.
Middle-income countries  have, in  general,  fared  better  than  low income  countries  and  small
economies better than large ones.  Domestic policies also had a major impact on countries' economic
performance and their external financing requirements.
5Despite  the rich diversity of  the countries that  make up  the centinent,  there  are many
common serious problems now constraining their development: the highest population growth rate
in the world and in Africa's known history;  low levels of investment and saving, inefficient resource
use, weak institutional capacity and human resources, rccent declines in per capita income and living
standards, growing  ecological  deterioration, and increasing  marginalization  from the rest of the world.
The crisis
Sub-Saharan Africa has by now experienced a decade of falling per capita incomes and has
shown signs of erosion of its land and human resources.
In the late 1970s most African countries (in particular the SPA countries expanded public
consumption and investment.  Instead of raising savings, they financed much of this with foreign
funds, taking advantage of expanded borrowing based on  unprecedented high export prices and
negative real interest rates in international markets.  This quick expansion required rapidly rising
imports, which grew faster than during any other period in the past thirty years (7.6 percent annually
for the years 1974-80). Imports were partly financed by nonconcessional  borrowing. This borrowing
continued up to 1982-83  despite a sudden rise in international interest rates, as borrowers and lenders
believed that the high export volumes prior to the first oil shock could be soon restored, and that the
high export prices would continue.  These expectations did not  materialize and soon the  boom
became bust. In 1984 nonconcessional  lending was sharply reduced, in 1985  there was virtually  none.
The first half of the 1980s  indicated that the development strategy adopted by most African
countries at the time of their independence had failed to cope with these realities and to achieve
6what had been expected.  The region was undergoing a severe crisis as shown in Table 2.  Their
economies were sliding  rapidly.  The high growth (7 p~ercent  a year) achieved  before the first oil shock
first gave way to slower growth (2.7 percent annual average for 1974-80)  that was not sufficient to
match the rapidly expanding population.  Later, during 1980-84 both output and gross national
income (GNY) shrank a. an average annual rate of 1.1 percent a year. The loss in income was caused
by the drop in output and exports; an all-time favorable terms of trade spared the region an even
worse loss.
7Table 2  Evolution  of key ewDomic indicatos for Sub.Saharan  Afica,  1967-88
(average  annual  percentage  change, unless  otherwise indicated)
................................  ....  .............. v*..................................  ......  .......  ...........................  .
1967-73 1974-80  1981-84  1985-87 1988
GDP  7.0  2.7  -1.1  2.6  2.5
Export volume  17.1  0.2  -7.5  2.1  1.2
Import volume  4.3  7.6  -6.8  -0.7  -2.8
GDI (percent of GNP)  a/  16.7  22.3  16.7  15.0  16.6
GNS (percent of GNP)  a/  13.0  17.2  9.0  8.8  8.0
Private consumption  4.1  1.8  1.1  1.3  2.2
Gross ODA (percent of GNP)  b/  3.2  3.6  4.2  6.6  8.9
Terms of trade index (1980=100)  a/  83.9  84.4  101.3  83.0  74.2
GNY
Total  3.9  4.5  -1.1  0.7  2.4
Per capita  1.2  1.7  4.1  -2.4  -0.9
Notes:  a/  Refers to 1966-73
b/  Refers to 1970-73
Source:  World Bank data files
The increase in the investment rate that took p!ace in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1974-80  did not
translate into higher output growth in the following  periods, as could have been expected. The drop
in output that occurred in 1981-84  was caused in part by the very low efficiency  of investment. (Once
the reform programs began to help raise the  efficiency  of investment,  GDP increased despite lower
investment rates, see Table 2).
The crisis was pervasive, affecting all areas of the economies.  During 1981-84  export and
import volumes fell (by 7.5 and 6.8 percent annually, respectively); investment as a percentage of
GNP went back to the 1966-73  levels (16.7 percent); gross national savings  as a percentage of GNP
averaged only 9 percent, or about half their 1974-80  level; foreign direct investment expanded at the
lowest rate of the iast thirty years;  export market shares continued to erode. To make matters worse,
net nonconcessional capital flows  coUlapsed,  and the negative real interest rates of the past gave way
8to very high ones.  Debt at 45 percent of GNP in 1983-84  was more than double its 1975 level, and
the debt service payments, despite rescheduling, reached 27 percent of exports in 1984 or 4 times
higher than in 1975. Despite the crumbling  economies private consumption  continued to grow during
1981-84,  albeit at a small and reduced rate (1.1 per cent a year), financed by a rapid decline in the
gross national savings rate (which reached an all time low of 7.3 percent of GNP in 1983) and
modestly increasing net ODA flows. However, this consumption growth was lower than population
growth, and per capita consumption declined at 2 percent a year.
The crisis of the  1980s was less severe for the oil importing countries than for  the oil
exporters, in part because export earnings fell loss and they relied more on foreign aid than on
commercial  borrowing. During 1981-84  GDP still grew, albeit at a negligible  rate (1.1 percent annual
average), the lowest of any other period in the past thirty years. Private consumption also continued
to grow (at 1.2 percent), but the rate was half what had been in the past.  After slowing  down in the
previous period, both export and import volumes dropped at a rate of 2.6 and 3.5 percent a year,
respectively. The investment share of GNP (17.7 percent) was lower than during 1974-80,  but was
still the second highest of all periods under review.  However, the gross national savings share of
GNP fell to an all time low (7.8 percent).  The resulting investment-savings  gap  (9.9 percent of
GNP) was the largest of any other period in the past thirty years, and much larger than the gap for
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.
High population growth, oil price and international interest rates shocks, war and drought
contributed to the crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa, but weak economic management was also a major
cause.  Inappropriate  domestic  policies and  lack of  policy implementing capacity were  key
impediments to improved economic performance. The need to redress the mistakes of the past and
9make the  necessary adjustments began to  be  felt in  the early 1980s.  The inability of African
economies to respond to the shocks of the 1980s  had made the case for reforms too strong to ignore.
The reforms
By the mid-1980s  many Sub-Saharan countries had begun the reform process; by mid-1990,
29 Sub-Saharan African countries had active Bank-supported adjustment programs, and 27 had IMF-
supported programs.
Reforms programs started at first in the area of macroeconomic  stabilization;  fiscal,  monetary,
exchange rate and other macroeconomic  reforms were used to bring aggregate expenditures in line
with total available resources. The programs that followed, in the later  1980s, focused more on
increasing output and reducing the social costs of adjustment. These reform programs increased the
emphasis on adjustment policies to  improve productivity and increase production and exports by
liberalizing  external and domestic trade, raising producer prices, strengthening the financial sector,
restructuring  public  enterprises,  improving public  investment programming, reordering  public
expenditure priorities, and improving  performance in key sectors, especially  agriculture and industry.
These reform efforts have resulted in some improvements in many countries in  the real
exchange rate, real interest rates, fiscal  balances, trade liberalization,  pricing and public management,
and other policies.
Even though the results for all Sub-Saharan Africa are dampened by those countries that have
not  engaged in reforms, the trends show how output growth has been restored for the  region,
10reaching 3.6 percent in 1989,  compared to -1.1  percent in 1981-84. Export performance is beginning
to turn around, but import volumes are still declining,  albeit at a iower pace than before the reform
period. Gross domestic investment  and national savings,  which reached their lowest point in 1983-85,
are no longer declining as a percent of GNP (although the gap between the two remains about the
same as in the early 1980s). Private consumption began to recover in 1985-87  and improved in 1988,
as stronger output growth was channeled more into consumption than savings. (See Table 2.)
Achievements are  much more transparent  when  the  record  for  reforming countries is
examined separately.  Despite  delays, slippages, reversals, and  other  signs of  mixed policy
performance, the progress that they have achieved  since the mid-1980s  is, on balance, positive as can
be seen from Table 3 below, showing the performance of countries eligible for the Special Program
of Assistance (SPA), which covers most reforming countries.
11Table 3  Evolution  of key economic  indicators  for SPA couni  1967-88  c
(average  annual  percentage change, unle  otherwie  indcated)
1967-73 1974-80  1981-84  1985-87  1988
GDP  3.8  1.4  0.4  3.3  4.0
Export volume  4.7  1.1  -5.5  6.0  0.1
Import volume  3.6  1.9  -2.3  4.0  5.0
GDI (percent of GNP)  a/  15.2  19.1  17.2  17.7  17.7
GNS (percent of GNP)  a/  12.0  10.6  8.5  7.9  6.8
Private consumption  2.2  0.1  -0.5  2.7  2.2
Gross ODA (percent of GNP)  b/  4.7  7.5  10.!  12.5  15.0
Terms of trade index (1980=100)  a/  124.0  129.9  109.5  107.2  108.5
GNY
Total  3.6  0.8  0.9  2.7  5.8
Per capita  0.8  -2.0  -2.2  -0.6  2.4
…--  - -- - -- -- - -- - -- - -- -- - -- - -- - -- -- - -- - -- - -- -- - -- - -- - -- -- - -- - -- - -- -- - -- - -- -
Note:  a/  Refers to 1966-73
b/  Refers to 1970-73
c/  Eligible  countries at the end of 1989  included:  Benin, Burundi, Central African Republic,
Chad, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania,
Togo, Uganda and Zaire.
Source:  World Bank data files
GDP growth has averaged about 3.4 percent annually since reforms started, close to the
average before the first oil shock, thus reversing a decade of declining per capita growth.  Imports
and exports have performed very strongly, reversing a decline. Because of the high GDP and export
growth and favorable terms of trade, gross national income increased at an average of more than 4
percent a year during 1985-88,  and per capita income has increased in 1988 for the first time since
the first oil shoclk Private consumption in the SPA countries has posted increases after the reforms
started, but not sufficiently  high to offset population growth. However, the share of gross domestic
investment in GNP has improved only modestly from its 1981-84  level, and the share of national
saving in GNP has continued to deteriorate.  To compensate for the low national savings  (7 percent
12
lof GNP in 1985-88)  donors have over time considerably  stepped up their ODA contributions, which
reached about 14 percent of the SPA countries' GNP during 1985-88,  or almost three times the share
in 1970-73. This ever-growing  recourse to outside resources for growth and development reflects the
failure of the African economies to achieve sustainable growth.
External flows and the inmestment-savings  gap in Sub-Saharan Africa
As national savings dwindled and public consumption and investment continued, external
resources have been used to finance growing  fiscal deficits  on both current and capital budgets. The
investment-savings  gap has increased two and a half times in 22 years, growing from 3.7 percent of
GNP in 1966-73 to  7.4 percent in 1985-88  While in 1966 almost 90 percent of investment was
financed by Sub-Saharan Africa's savings,  in 1988  only 50 percent was.  I ne persistent widening of
this gap has occurred mainly in the IDA-only countries 2/.  In Nigeria the gap decreased to its
lowest point in 1974-80  and in the 1980s  it was half than in the late 1960s  and early 1970s. In other
IBRD countries the gap increased to its highest point in 1974-80  and decreased in the 1980s,  so that
in 1988 it was at the same level than in 1967-73. (See Table 4.)
2/  Countries eligible to borrow IDA credits but not IBRD loans.
13Table 4  Investment and savings  in Sub-Saharan Africa, 196648
(average annual percentage of GNP)
1966-73  1974-80  1981-84  1985-87  1988
Sub-Saharan Africa
Gross domestic investment  16.7  22.3  16.7  15.0  16.6
Gross national savings  13.0  17.2  9.0  8.8  8.0
Gap  a/  3.7  5.1  7.7  6.2  8.6
Nigeria
Gross domestic investment  14.8  22.8  13.8  10.3  13.6
Gross national savings  10.3  23.7  8.8  8.4  8.7
Gap  a/  4.5  -0.9  5.0  1.9  4.9
Other IBRD countries
Gross domestic investment  22.2  29.5  26.4  21.8  19.6
Gross national savings  14.2  12.2  13.7  14.7  11.7
Gap  a/  8.0  17.3  12.7  7.1  7.9
IDA-only countries
Gross domestic investment  16.1  18.8  16.8  16.1  16.3
Gross national savings  13.8  10.6  7.3  6.9  5.7
Gap  a/  2.3  8.2  9.5  9.2  10.6
…--  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . - - . . . . . . - - . - - - - - - - - - - -...
Note:  a/  Defined as investment minus savings
Source:  World Bank data files
The decline in savings in Sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by three factors: a) declining
income, which leaves fewer resources for  public and  private consumption and  savings; b)  the
govemment's negative savings that  resulted from growing recurrent budget deficits; and c) some
misclassification  of foreign inflows that may make the level of domestic savings look lower than it
actually is.
National accounting identities define all net foreign capital as investment (by definition, net
capital inflows finance the  gap between domestic investment and national savings).  From the
perspective of changes in the stock of national savings,  this definition may  be correct -- the increase
14in foreign liabilities  created by the capital inflows  reduces the contribution that national savings  make
to  national assets.  (If capital  inflows are  in the  form of  transfers, however, the definition is
inappropriate because the inflows  do not give rise to liabilities.) In practice, however, some of the
capital inflows  finance consumption, not investment, and smaller inflows  would reduce consumption
as well as investment.  In these cases, the accounting identities make the investment rate appear
higher than it is and the national savings  rate appear lower than it is. Increases in net capital inflows
will increase the discrepancy between apparent and actual rates.  To illustrate, between 1970 and
1988, gross national savings declined by 5.3 percentage points of GNP; over the same period, net
external financing increased by 5.5 percentage points of GNP. This overstatement of investment and
understatement of savings presents a critical problem in projecting financing requirements, but may
also help explain the puzzle posed by the declining  savings  rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, at a time when
per capita incomes only stagnated.
Net external flows to  Sub-Saharan Africa have almost doubled as a percentage of GNP
during  the  past  two decades.  Net  loan disbursements plus grants and  net  foreign investment
amounted to 6 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's GNP in 1970,  but to 10.9  percent in 1988. Moreover,
the net flows  have become more concessional.  In 1970  less than half the net flows  were concessional
compared to five sixths in 1988.
15Savings,  Investment  and efficiency  of capital
This section discusses  the links between some key economic policies and the model's targets
and variables, indicating how policy  actions would help achieve target growth for Sub-Saharan Africa.
It also reviews the region's past performance to give an idea of the feasibility  of reaching the desired
targets in the medium term. The section starts with a discussion  of the need for investment required
to  reach the target growth rates.  The relation between investment and output growth is a key
behavioral parameter determining output growth. Second, there is a discussion  of factors determining
the demand for investment, which argues that inadequate demand for investment in Sub-Saharan
Africa is an  important impairment to investment and growth.  Third, this section then analyses,
domestic savings.  Given the importance of public savings in increasing gross domestic savings, it
suggests policy measures to reduce the current public deficit.  A discussion about private savings
follows,  with the conclusion that raising private savings  will be a medium-term effort contingent on
establishing predictable  macroeconomic conditions and  achieving growth.  Fourth,  this section
discusses policy actions to improve the efficiency  of investment, needed to reach the target growth
rates.  Key policies cover public sector management, financial intermediation, relative prices, and
institutional and human capital development. Finally,  this section summarizes  the impact of principal
policy actions available to modify the main behavioral parameters of the model and discusses the
mechanisms through which these actions operate. l/
3/  This discussion  is based on the conceptual framework  developed in the World Bank's publication
Adjustment Lending Policies for Suistainable  Growth.
16Need fo-r
In the model, the GDP growth rate determines the need for investment, depending on the
incremental-output-ri,tio (ICOR), which is a  behavioral parameter determined by policies and by
economic factors exogenous to the model.  The ICOR, commonly referred to as the efficiency  of
capital,  is often  approximated by the  ratio  of  the  investment rate  to  the  rate  of  growth of
production 4/. Although economic growth is determined by many variables, which are affected by
different policy actions as well as by non-controllable events, the effects of these variables can be
summarized by the level of investment and its productivity.  However, no unique instrument of
economic policy can lead to the desired levels of investment and capital efficiency.
Achieving  an aggregate growth rate of 5 percent by 2000 would require an annual investment
rate of 25 percent of GDP, provided that the ICOR is not higher than 5 (or the efficiency  of capital
is at least 20 percent).  Reaching these levels  of investment and efficiency  of capital will  not be easy.
In the past (during 1968-88),  the region as a whole achieved an average annual growth rate of 3.5
percent (2 percent when Nigeria is excluded), and an investment to GDP ratio of 17.5 percent (18
percent when Nigeria is excluded), with an implied efficiency of capital of 20 percent  (11 percent
when Nigeria is excluded).  Only ten Sub-Saharan countries had investment rates and efficiency  of
4/ A higher value for the ICOR implies lower efficiency  of capital, and vice versa.  (The efficiency
of new capital investment is the reciprocal of the ICOR.) Actual values for ICORs  can be estimated
in various ways,  but the simplest is the rate of new investment over the rate of GDP growth in the
same year.  (In the empirial presentation in this paper, the ICOR is usually  calculated as investment
in the previous year divided by the increment of GDP (valued at the previous year's price).) As with
most summary  empirical measures, the ICOR masks  several complexities  and will vary depending on
the length of the period chosen, whether current or constant prices are used, exogenous effects on
output levels (including those caused by changes in expenditures resulting from changes in the terms
of trade), changes in utilization of capacity, and various delays between the time when investments
are made and production begins to increase (for example, investments in human capital may have a
longer lead time than investments in farms and factories).
17capital that yielded average annual growth rates equal or superior to the 5 percent target during 1968-
88 (Chart 1).  In three of these countries good performance can be explained largely by unusually
high oil export revenues.  The 1980s  witnessed a deteriorating situation (see Chart 2), caused by a
less favorable international economic environment and the accumulating  effects of past government
economic intervention.  During the period 1980-88,  the arithmetical average annual growth rate for
Sub-Saharan Africa was about 1.i percent (1.7 percent excluding  Nigeria), with investment reaching
about 16 percent of GDP (about 18 percent excluding  Nigeria).  Lte efficiency  of capital during this
period was only 7 perccnt (10 percent excluding Nigeria).
While some increase in growth from recent low  levels can be expected from larger and better
use of (reportedly extensive) idle capacity, to go beyond past levels  of growth will require substantial
increases  in both investments and capital efficiency. To achieve  them decisive  policy action is needed,
leading to more competitive, as well as  stable, prices and exchange rates, simpler regulations, and
greatly improved institutional efficiency. While the policy measures and their sequencing will have
to be tailored to the circumstances of each country, the sooner the measures are put in place, and
the more substantial they are, the better will be their contribution to economic performance.
The challenge for Sub-Saharan African countries becomes  even bigger when account is taken
of the need for large investment in human resources and basic infrastructure. Investment in human
capital both improves current living  conditions for the population and increases the productivity  of
physical investment, providing the basis for sustained growth.  Public investment in infrastructure,
complementary to production activities, is also critical to improve efficiency  of capital as well as to
foster investment opportunities.  However, neither of these two forms of necessary investments is
likely to  be quickly translated into significant increases in output.  Moreover, in most countries,
18substantial expenditures are needed simply  to make up for past neglect and deterioration of sosial
facilities and infrastructure.
Therefore, because a large share of investment  wil' have relatively lower productivity  in the
near-term, to achieve the overall rates of capital efficiency required to meet the target growth, the
efficiency of directly productive new investment will need to surpass the 20 percent productivity
postulated for overall new investment. Or, altematively, the level (or rate) of new investment will
have to be higher than the postulated 25 percent of GDP to compensate for the lower efficiency
caused by the special problems of the region.
19Chart  I.
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21Demand  for  inestment
The common view emphasizes the inadequacy  of funds for investment.  However, inadequate
demand for imvestment  is equally or more important in explaining low levels of investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  This inadeauate demand has been caused by the insufficiency  of sound public
investment projects that are attractive to international or bilateral lenders and donors, and by low and
uncertain returns on private domestic assets -- caused in part by distorted economic and financial
policies as well as political animosity and uncertainty which make private investment less attractive
than in other countries. The weak demand for domestic investment is demonstrated by large capital
flight from the region.  While difficult to evaluate, cumulative capital from 36 Sub-Saharan African
countries may have amounted to as much as US$40 billion between 1976 and 1987 5I. This level
of cumulative capital outflows between 1976 and 1987 is equivalent to about half the total official
development assistance received by Sub-Saharan Africa during the same period.  This situation
suggests  that stagnant investment  and output resulted from inadequate demand for investment  as well
as inadequate national savings  and external financing.
This capital outflow represents domestic resources that could have been used to increase
domestic investment and output, if the demand (in contrast to the need) for domestic investment had
been  stronger.  Keeping  these  resources  within  Africa  would  have  required  a  favorable
macroeconomic  environment, investment  opportunities yielding  attractive returns, and credibility  that
./  See Chang and Cumby. This estimate is based on a broad definition of capital flight, measuring
the total increase in the private sector's net foreign assets.  An alternative measurement, based on
the change in the stock of private claims held abroad, gives an estimate about 20 percent lower.  In
a different study, Alexander Yeats calculated that African countries paid considerably more than
other  developing countries for the same imports; part cf these higher payments is a conduit for
capital flight.
22appropriate policies would continue. Had this capital been invested in the region,  it could have raised
the overall investment rate by about 2 percent of GDP on average during the period.  Assuming  a
linear function between investment and output, this cumulative capital flight would have caused an
output loss by 1987 of about 30 percent of GDP.
Reducing capital flight would require a substantial increase in the demand for domestic
investment. Reform of key policies would help, including the following:
A.  Establishing and  maintaining a competitive and predictable real exchange rate, a
budget deficit low  enough to be sustained  without recourse to excessive  borrowing  and
monetary growth, and a low and stable inflation rate;
B.  Minimizing  price distortions and removing excessive  regulations on production and
trade, so that efficient activities are adequately remunerated and inefficient ones are
discouraged;
C.  Removing legal and bureaucratic impediments to investment by domestic and foreign
individuals  and firms;
D.  Investing in and improving maintenance of public infrastructure that is necessary to
raise the level and efficiency  of production; and
E.  Increasing financial intermediation by expanding or  creating a  resilient financial
system, with adequate supervision to  ensure  the existence of sound and  efficient
institutions.
23Domestic savings  anA  investmen
Distorted policies that discourage and limit the scope for domestic savings,  plus high interest
payments on foreign debt, have also substantially  reduced the region's capacity  to finance  investment.
Between 1966 and 1988 the share of gross national savings  in GNP dropped more than a third, to
8 percent, §/ and  the investment-savings  gap  increased sevenfold, to 9.2 percent  of GNP.  The
decline in national savings was caused by growing negative savings  of the public sector and a slight
decline in private savings,  while net factor payments abroad were increasing. To meet the long-term
investment target (25 percent of GDP), domestic savings  will have to increase substantially. Policy
measures to increase public as well as private savings are discussed  below.
Public savings and investment
For the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries, income levels are low and domestic
financial systems  are underdeveloped and weak. Therefore, the potential to increase private savings
in the shortrun is low. Thus efforts to raise domestic savings  have to focus first on the public sector.
Increasing public sector deficits have been the main reason behind a dramatic decline in the overall
domestic savings rate  in  Sub-Saharan Africa.  Current  public sector deficits (excluding capital
expenditures) increased from 3.3 percent of GDP to 7.2 percent of ODP during 1972-87.
§/  The decline of national savings might have been lower than estimated because of the possible
overreporting of foreign-funded investment and underreporting of  foreign-funded consumption.
Savings are calculated as the difference between production and consumption.  To the extent that
part of consumption has actually been financed by foreign funds (and would not occur without this
foreign financing), actual domestic savings  will be higher than calculated.
24The deficits have largely been the result of weak revenue performance and the high share of
government consumption in  GDP.  In  1988 government consumption in  Sub-Saharan Africa
represented 15 percent of GDP; which is a higher share than in any developing region.  Reducing
the  public sector  deficit will contribute to  a  more stable macroeconomic environment, to  an
improvement in the balance of payments current account, and to an increase in private savings.  2/
Reducing current public expenditures or increasing revenues are difficult, and governments
are  often  tempted to  cut public investments more than warranted.  The result is a decline in
investment and growth. On the other hand, a reduction of current public expenditures through a cut
in essential services could require the private sector to increase its expenditures on these, which
would diminish the increase in total domestic savings.  When attempting to reduce government
expenditures, special care should also be taken to keep expenditures on maintenance at adequate
levels, since their neglect has often increased the need for future investment.
Reducing selective current expenditures together with raising  revenue through measures that
imply minimum  distortion are required to reduce the public sector deficit without adversely  affecting
other sectors of the economy. Among measures to reduce current expenditures, the following  would
be appropriate for most Sub-Saharan African countries: reducing operational subsidies to parastatal
and public enterprises; tighter control over public sector wages and the number of public workers;
and lower defense spending.  Among measures to enhance  public revenues are: switching from
reliance on trade taxes to taxes on consumption and income; charging a larger share of the cost for
2/ T'he impact of the reduction of the public deficit on the rest of the economy depends on how the
deficit was financed and how it is reduced.
25infrastructure  and  other  public  services  --  roads,  electricity,  water  and  sewerage,  and
telecommunications  (allowing for cross-subsidization  among different groups of consumers).
Private savings
Private savings  in Sub-Saharan Africa do not seem to have been significantly  affected during
the period of stagnating or declining output.  They have been a relatively  constant share of GDP for
over 15 years, amounting to 21 and 20 percent of GDP in 1972 and 1987, respectively  Q/.  However,
over the medium to longterm Sub-Saharan African countries will need to increase private savings  to
reduce dependency on foreign aid.  The best way to increase private savings is the application of
policies conducive to a stable macroeconomic  environment and steady  growth, which help create the
economic confidence needed to promote larger private savings.
The realization of the virtuous circle "growth -saving. - growth"  requires a resilient financial
system to  help  mobilize financial resources for  sound investment opportunities  and  a shift  of
resources from less attractive to more profitable activities  as other distortions are reduced. Financial
systems  will  be more effective in mobilizing  and allocating resources if governments minimize the use
of widespread  credit allocation systems  -- unrelated to sector economic  profitability  -- and the practice
of financing the public deficit through commercial banks.  Moreover, severely impaired financial
institutions (with many non-performing assets) will need to be closed or  restructured (which may
require additional resources to pay off depositors and lay off personnel), while an appropriate set of
regulations and conditions are established to  facilitate entry to domestic banking and encourage
competition.
/  See Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth.
26Low or negative real interest rates have prevailed in most Sub-Saharan African countries,
discouraging  the holding of financial  assets, and thereby reducing financial  deepening. Although the
final impact of low interest rates on levels of savings and investment is uncertain, a recent study of
eighty-one developing economies 2/  showed that low interest rates, by favoring nonfinancial forms
of savings, constrained growth mainly through a reduction of the productivity  of investments.
Efficiency  of investment
High rates of saving and investment, although necessary for sustained growth of output, do
not guarantee it. Worldwide  empirical  evidence has not shown a straightforward  link between growth
and either saving or investment (1989 World Bank Conference on Development Economics,  Angus
Deaton).  Several economic models (1962, Arrow; 1986, 1988,  Romer; and 1988, Lucas) emphasize
the role of human capital as a necessary complement to physical capital accumulation to achieve
growth.  In more general terms, the extent to which physical  investment results in sustained growth
depends on the efficiency  of investment.
The efficiency of investment has drastically  declined in Sub-Saharan African during the last
30 years.  Although official figures might overestimate investment values for recent years (because
recerrent  public expenditures financed by foreign project aid are usually classified as capital, or
investment,  expenditures), the conclusions  are still striking. The rate of return on net investment  has
2/  1989 Background Paper for WDR by Gelb.
27declined  fourteen-fold  between  1961-73 and  1980-87. flOI  During  1980-88, the  average
productivity  of new investment was only 7 percent, as shown in Chart 2.
The main causes for the low,  and declining  efficiency  of capital in Sub-Saharan Africa can be
traced to distortions in the following  policy  areas: poor public  sector management including  bad public
investments; inadequate or inappropriate financial intermediation; price distortions will led to less
productive  resource  allocation; and  inadequate  institutional  and  human  capital development.
Sustainable long-term growth will require decisive policy reform in all these areas to reverse the
declining trend of capital efficiency and to achieve the levels required to reach the output growth
targets.
Public  spending decisions  strongly affect the efficiency  of overall investments. The role of the
government is particularly large in Sub-Saharan African countries -- total public expenditures were
more than 27 percent of GNP in  1986 (compared to  19 percent in low-income  countries outside
Africa).  Although no estimate of the return on total public investments is available, Sub-Saharan
Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth presents examples  of poorly  justified and highly  inefficient
public investments. There has been duplication and waste, and several investments have been over-
dimensioned. In addition to the lack of operation of market mechanisms or alternative objective
criteria to evaluate public investment projects, the rapid increase in foreign financing in the 1980s
may have tended  to  relax the rigor of investment decisions.  Investments in new facilities and
equipment have also been  preferred over  maintenance of existing ones, resulting in  a  marked
deterioration of existing capital stock, thereby reducing overall productivity.
J/  Based on the estimate from Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, which
assumes a depreciation rate of 10 percent of GDP.
28Direct allocation of credit and forced lending have been widely  used in Sub Saharan Africa,
often to support and subsidize  investments of low efficiency  rather than to finance more economically
productive investments. The principal problem of administratively  allocated credit is the lack of link
between investments financed through that credit and their productivity, resulting in an arbitrary
allocation process. As a result, overall efficiency  of investment suffers. In many cases credit has been
directed to cover continuous losses of public sector enterprises.  That credit does not contribute to
increasing output, while  crowding  out potential productive investors. Highly  subsidized  credit has also
undermined the need for investments to be productive because debt service obligations correspond
to only a portion of the original amount borrowed. Forcing financial  institutions to lend to inefficient
sectors or enterprises has resulted in high levels of non-performing assets, which may require those
institutions to increase interest charged to other borrowers, while reducing the level of financial
intermediation.
Inefficient price distortions are more common in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions.
Large state  monopolies, widespread subsidies, controlled domestic prices and interest  rates, and
overvalued currencies coupled with rigid exchange rates have directed investments to the activities
that  benefit  most from the  distortions rather  than to  those with the largest economic returns.
Agricultural production, which presents comparative advantages in many of the countries of the
region, has been especially affected by restrictions on private marketing  of key crops and by low farm
prices. These policies, together with overvalued currencies, have kept agricultural growth well below
its potential during the past 30 years, at only 2 percent per year. Agricultural exports have declined,
and food imports are increasing at about 7 percent per year. For agriculture to develop its potential,
governments have to reduce implicit  and explicit taxation. Agricultural  exports (and efficient import
29substitution) will require adequate exchange rate and trade policies,  that eliminate the bias produced
through overvalued currencies, heavy import protection and export subsidies that  favor mainly
industrial production.
The lack of well-develo,ed public and orivate institutions has been an important constraint
to  efficiency and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Appropriate economic policies can create the
conditions for higher efficiency;  but achieving  higher efficiency  and sustainable growth over the long
term also requires the development of human and institutional capacity. Three distinct elements of
required capacity building in Sub-Saharan African countries are mentioned in Sub-Saharan Africa:
From Crisis  to Sustainable Growth. They are: i) human  development, especially  the provision of basic
health, education, nutrition, and technical skills; ii) the restructuring of many public and private
institutions to  create  an environment in which skilled workers can function effectively; and  iii)
political leadership that understands that institutions are fragile entities, painstakingly  built up, and
therefore requiring sustained nurturing.
Impact of policy actions
The final impact of policy actions on key behavioral parameters of an economy (the ratio of
gross investment to GDP, the ratio of domestic savings to GDP, the ratio of incremental output to
new gross investment, the import elasticity and export growth) is the result of the interaction of
multiple transmitting mechanisms. Policy  actions might affect a given parameter "directly"  through
one specific  mechanism  (for example, import tariffs reduce imports by increasing  their domestic price)
or "indirectly"  through the interaction of different mechanisms  (for example,  import liberalization  may
30increase exports because an increased demand for imports will increase demand for foreign currency
which may produce an exchange rate depreciation that raises incentives to exporters).
Some parameters (the ratios of investment and savings to GDP and the ratio of incremental
output  to  new investment) can be  directly modified, without negative consequences for other
parameters or  risk of  deviating from the growth targets, but  policies designed to  affect other
parameters directly (for example, import restric: ons to lower the import elasticity  or export subsidies
to raise export growth) are likely to lower growth and efficiency. In addition, other parameters that
affect long-term  development, have not been incorporated in the projections model,  but nevertheless,
need to be considered for policy design. Among them, some of the most important are population
growth, income distribution, and environmental conservation.
The following  is a summary of the main policy tools to influence the principal parameters of
the model and a discussion  of the main mechanisms  through which they operate.
Increase in demand for investment
Reduction of current  public deficit:  Depending on how the deficit is financed, reducing it may
increase long-run demand for private investment by lowering inflation or interest rates, although
aggregate demand is also initially compressed. Reducing it also increases private savings.
Reduction of public investment:  Reducing public investment increases the demand for private
investment if the projects that were eliminated are substitutes for private investment,  but reduces the
demand for private investment if the eliminated projects complemented it (such as infrastructure).
31Tax increases: Depending on the type of taxes,  increases in taxes may reduce short-term demand for
private investment through reduction in profitability of capital, but may raise long-term private
demand for investment if they help reduce inflation and the need for future devaluation. They also
reduce private savings through reduction in disposable income.
Devaluation: Devaluation of a controlled, overvalued exchange rate increases long-term demand for
private investment through increase in profitability of tradable goods.  It  also increases long-run
private savings through increases in disposable income. It also promotes exports. In the absence of
significant protection it increases efficiency of capital by stimulating more efficient production of
exports and import substitutes.  However, a devaluation of a reasonable exchange rate  may only
produce inflation and no sustainable change in the real exchange rate.
Monetary contraction on restrictive  credit policy:  In the short-run, it reduces the private demand for
investment through higher real interest rates, lower aggregate demand and lower profitability of
capita.
Increase in private savings
Monetary contraction or restrictive credit 22licy:  In conjunction with lowering the current fiscal
deficit monetary contraction increases long-run private savings through low-.r inflation, increased
disposable income, and increased return on financial savings.
Financial liberalization: When the result is to eliminate highly  negative. zontrolled interest rates, it
increases private savings through  increase in the remuneration on financial savings. It  improves
efficiency  of capital through increase in real interest rates, and consequent elimination of unprofitable
investme.its.
32Increase in efficiency of capital
Foreign trade liberalization: When accompanied by reduction in domestic price and trade controls,
foreign trade  liberalization raises the efficiency of capital closer to  world standards by shifting
production to sectors able to compete internationally. It also promotes exports by reducing the anti-
export bias of protection. However,  trade liberalization,  if excessive  or not appropriatly implemented,
can be dangerous  to some economies, specially because structural deficiencies keep them from
competing internationally.
Elimination of directed credit:  It increases the efficiency  of capital by permitting different activities
and sectors to compete for available credit.  In the absence of serious price distortions, the more
efficient activities  would be better able to afford access  to credit, while less efficient ones would have
to modernize, restructure or stop.
Improvement in composition of public investment:  It increases the efficiency of capital through
better  application of  economic/social cost  benefit  analysis to  public investment. Economically
justifiable projects (including externalities) would replace projects imposed by interest groups.
Improving composition of public expenditures:  It increases the efficiency of the capital stock by
reallocating expenditures from building new capacity to  maintenance, and making better  use of
existing  capacity. Expenditures in improving  human capital provide the basis  for long-term sustainable
growth.
The required intensity of the policies discussed  above and the proper sequencing vary among
the different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the need for their application is common to
most countries if the target growth rates are to be achieved. Implementation of these policy  reforms
will affect other parameters of the economy, most notably export growth and the import elasticity.
33Most exports from Sub-Saharan Africa are primary commodities, for which Sub- Saharan
Africa has lost an important share of the world market. Recovering or increasing such share in the
medium-term will be difficult, but not impossible  if adequate policies are implemented.  However,
these exports are not likely to become a leading force behind long-term export growth given the low
growth of world demand for these commodities.  In  the long term, as a  result of the use of a
competitive exchange rate and the reduction of the anti-export bias of the current  protectionist
policies, non-traditional exports can be expected to increase their share in total exports and become
a driving force in expanding the value of total exports.
Trade liberalization, if coupled with increased access to foreign financing, is likely to raise
import elasticities  in Sub-Saharan economies in the medium term, which will help compensate for the
compression of imports in the late  1970s and early 1980s. This is also consistent with historical
evidence showing that the ratio of imports to GDP increases during the early stages of sustained
economic development to levels that could surpass 30-35 percent.  However, over the longer term,
trade  liberalization should also improve capital efficiency, which will stabilize and possibly lower
import elasticities.  The import elasticity will also be affected by exchange rate  policies, and  its
sustainability at a high level will require either equivalent export growth or continued reliance on
external financing.
34Estimated  financing  requirements
This section discusses the range of projected capital requirements for Sub-Saharan Africa
during the 1990s,  the sensitivity of the projections to changes in major parameters, the model and
assumptions that underlie the projections, and some caveats about some of the parameters used in
the model.
Projected gnrss external capital requirements
Financing requirements are projected on a gross basis,  including  debt service obligations. The
requirements are the sum of three major components: the trade balance (of goods and services,
excluding interest obligations on external debt), all external debt service obligations, and assumed
increases in foreign reserves.  Financing requirements for the region thus comprise both what is
required to improve growth and development in the future and to deal adequately with the legacy
of  past  borrowing for  earlier  consumption and  investment expenditures.  The  total  regional
requirements are the sum of separate estimates for Nigeria,  selected IBRD borrowers, and IDA-only
countries.
Sub-Saharan Africa
The gross foreign financing requirements for all of Sub-Saharan Africa, before debt relief of
any kind or the accumulation of new arrears, are projectad to average about $28 billion a year (in
35nominal prices) between  1991 and  2000, or  about $50 per  capita annually (see  Chart  3) LI/.
These projected financing requirements compare with estimated gross financing of $27-28 billion in
1988 and $24-25 billion in  1982 DJ.  Foreign financing at this level is equivalent to only about
12-14 percent of the total capital flows  to the developing world in 1988.
The annual levels decline in the middle of the decade to about $26-27 billion a year but rise
to over $30 billion by 2000. This profile reflects the combined movements in the balance of trade
in  goods and  services (excluding interest),  debt  service obligations, targets  for  increases in
intemational reserves, and private transfers.  The high levels in the early years are caused by high
debt service obligations, and the decline in these obligations later helps reduce requirements in the
middle of the decade.  Debt service obligations rise in 1991-93  on nonconcessional debt contracted
in the  last half of  the  1980s, but  they decline in  1994-97 and stabilize after that.  The  rising
requirements in the last part of the 1990s  result mainly from the continually widening trade deficit.
Debt service obligations -- before rescheduling  and before the accumulation  of any additional
arrears -- comprise more than half of the gross external financing  requirements in the first half of the
1990s,  but fall to about 40 percent by the end of the decade.  In comparison,  debt service obligations
11/  The empirical basis for the estimates excludes 11 Sub-Saharan countries (as well as Namibia)
because of tneir extremely small size (Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, and Equatorial Guinea),
inadequate statistics (Angola), or relatively small expected requirements for exceptional foreign
assistance (Botswana, Gabon,  Lesotho, Mauritius, Seychelles and Swaziland).  These countries
accounted for less than  10 rercent  of Sub-Saharan GDP  in the mid-1980s.  Three  mineral-rich
countries (Angola, Botswana, and Gabon) accounted for almost all of the economic output of these
countries (85 percent), and these countries also have relatively small debt service obligations and
trade deficits. Thus, the exclusion of this set of countries is unlikely to have a significant  impact on
projections of total financing requirements.
L2/ This historical figure includes an estimate for debt service obligations that were not paid, either
because they were rescheduled or allowed to fall into arrears. For example, unpaid debt service was
on the order of $10 billion in 1988 (excluding any intc.rest  arrears on short-term debt).
36were equivalent to about three fourths of the gross external financing requirements in 1988  but only
about a third in 1982  The importance of debt service in total requirements reveals that the external
financing problem in Africa is much more than a structural imbalance of imports and exports and
indicates the importance of debt relief measures as a source of financing.
37Chart 3
Gross Financing Requirements of Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989-2000
(Billions  of US dollars)
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a  Gross financing requirements before debt relief
+  Gross financing requirements after debt relief
*  Debt  service  obligations before debt relief
a  Debt  service  obligations after debt relief
X  Trade  deficit including private transfers 
V  Change in reservesTable 5  Past and projected key economic indicators for Sub-Saharan AfErica,  1985488,  1995,  2000
(average annual percentage change unless indicated otherwise)
1985-88  1995  2000
Domestic indicators
Real gross domestic product (GDP)  2.6  4.0  5.0
Real gross domestic investment (GDI)  -6.9  8.7  7.7
GDI (percent of GDP)  14.0  20.7  25.0
Gross domestic savings (percent of GDP)  11.4  16.6  20.0
Real consumption per capita  -0.7  0.1  1.3
Real gross national income (GNY)  -1.8  4.2  5.4
Real GNY per capita (1988 US$)  314.0  304.0  334.0
Real effective exchange rate  -4.0 a  -3.3  -3.4
ICOR (at 1988, 1994, 1999 prices respectively)  6.8  4.9  4.8
Trade indicators and official development assistance
Import elasticity  -1.6  1.0  1.0
Import volume  -4.0  4.1  5.0
Imports (percent of GDP)  22.9  33.1  39.3
Export volume  1.9  3.6  4.3
Exports (percent of GDP)  20.3  29.0  34.3
Import prices  6.3  4.6  5.4
Export prices  -4.6  4.8  5.9
Terms of trade index (1988=100)  111.5  103.5  107.5
Real gross ODA  13.9  3.3  1.1
Gross ODA (percent of GDP)  5.9  8.6  9.0
Debt service indicators before debt relief
Debt service ratio (percent of  exports)  - 26.5  15.7
Debt service (percent of GDP)  7.8  5.4
Note: a.  Median for about three fourths of the Sub-Saharan countries; 1986-88.
Sources:  World Bank data and projections.
The trade gap widens during the decade because export growth lags behind import growth
in aggregate (owing primarily  to the low growth in Nigerian oil exports -- see Annex), the terms of
trade decline for oil-importing countries, and the base for projecting import values is about a third
39larger than export values. Reducing the trade gap in the short-run would require measures to restrict
imports, which would also reduce efficiency  of production, constrain export performance, and thus
restrict growth of output.  Over the longer term, production structures might become less import-
intensive as domestic production becomes more efficient (although the result would depend, in part,
on relative prices). However, the most effective way to reduce the trade gap will  be to achieve  export
growth that is considerably faster than GDP growth, rather than to reduce import intensity. In the
short  run,  export  performance can  be  improved by getting exchange rates  more in  line with
competitors -- as demonstrated by many African countries since the mid 1980s.  But achieving
substantial long lasting increases in export growth rates is likely to be a slow process, especially  as it
requires achieving  very high growth rates in new products that initially  account for only a minor share
of total exports.  Raising  export growth rates in these new products will be easier if imported capital
and intermediate goods are not unnecessarily  constrained by inadequate foreign financing.
In real terms (deflated by projected import prices), the gross external financing requirements
would average about one fourth less than nominal requirements, averaging about $21 billion a year
in 1990 prices; by the end of the decade, they will have declined to about $19 billion in 1990 prices.
As African economies continue to grow  over the period, gross extemal financing requirements would
also decline as a share of GDP, from about 18 percent in the early 1990s  to about 13 percent by 2000
(see Chart 4).  After 2000, gross external financing requirements could continue to rise in nominal
terms while declining as a share of GDP.
40Table 6  Past and projected financing  and debt relief for Sub-Saharan  Africa, 1985-88, 1995, 2000
(average annual percent of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
1985-88  1995  2000
Total foreign  financing required
US$ billion  14.8  26.5  32.0
Percent  of GDP  10.2  14.2  12.7
Gross  foreign inflows projected  10.1  11.9  11.9
of which: Loan disbursements  6.5  6.2  5.8
Official transfers  3.1  5.0  5.3
Direct  foreign  investment  0.4  0.7  0.8
Net  debt  relief  a/  ..  b/  1.2  -0.7
Residual  financing  gap  0.1  1.1  1.5
Memo items:
Debt service  indicators  after debt relief
Debt service ratio (percent  of exports)  31.2  22.5  17.7
Debt service  6.5  6.6  6.1
Notes:  a/  Net of moratorium obligations on consolidated amounts.
b/  Debt  relief and accumulation of arrears have already been taken into account in
calculating financing requirements because  historical debt  service  is shown  as
payments, not obligations.
Sources:  World Bank data and projections.
Changes in underlying  assumptions and targets will affect the projections, mostly  because of
changes in the trade balance. A few examples illustrate the range of possible effects.  If the GDP
growth target were one percentage point higher in each year (which implies that the target proposed
in Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth would be achieved by 1995) -- and there
were no improvement in import efficiency,  gross financing requirements would rise by 20-25  percent,
or by $6-7 billion a year on average. If the assumed export growth were one percentage point higher
in each year (bringing it closer in line with that of other developing countries) - -and there were no
offsetting increases in imports, gross financing requirements  would fall by about 15 percent, or some
$4 billion a year on average.  If the projected terms of trade index were one percentage point below
41the base case scenario in each year, gross financing requirements would rise by about 15 percent, or
$4-5  billion a year on average.  And if policy  reforms could improve efficiency  enough to lower the
assumed import elasticitv by 10 percent (becoming 0.9 instead of 1.0), gross financing requirements
would decline by over 5 percent, or almost $2 billion a year. W3
13/  Changes in interest rates would affect debt service obligations but have only relatively minor
impact on overall financing requirements. In 1988,  about $28 billion, or 23 percent, of the region's
disbursed and outstanding long-term debt (excluding  Angola) had variable interest rates; in addition,
the stock of short-term trade credits amounted to about $8 billion. A rise in interest rates of one
percentage point would increase debt service obligations by only $0.3-0.4  billion a year, or only 1-2
percent of gross financing requirements for the region.
42Chart  4
Gross  Financing  Requirements  of Sub-Saharan  Africa,  1989-2000
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*  Gross  financing  requirements  before  debt  relief
*  Gross  finanLing  requirements  after  debt  relief
4  Debt  service  obligations  before  debt  relief
A  Debt  service  obligations  after  debt  relief
X  Trade  deficit  including  private  transfers
v  Change  in  reservesAnother  significant variable affecting these  requirements is the  price  of  oil,  and  the
uncertainty caused by the Middle East crisis in the last half of 1990  has increased the likelihood that
oil prices will be higher than previously  projected.  The longer-run impact of higher oil prices on
externa! financing requirements in the coming years depends on the scope for increased energy
efficiency  in Africa and the impact on OECD growth, import demand, and inflation, as well as on oil
prices themselves.  Assuming that Sub-Saharan countries continue to accelerate GDP growth to
achieve the target proposed in Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth by 2000, and
that higher oil prices dampen consumer demand and stimulate increased energy efficiency within
Africa, each dollar increase in oil prices  will  raise financing  requirements by about $250 million  a year
for the oil-importing African countries.  About $150 million  of this increased cost would fail on the
IDA-only countries.  If higher oil prices cause Sub-Saharan Africa's non-oil terms of  trade  to
deteriorate (because of weakened demand for Afric3n commodities  and rising costs of manufactured
imports), the additional financing requirements would be higher. 14/
The additional cost to the oil-importers would be less than the larger revenues of the five
oil-exporting  countries. At current export levels  (roughly 2 million  barrels a day), each dollar increase
in oil prices would raise export revenues by $750 million a year (mainly for the five largest oil-
exporting countries). Because the external financing  requirements of the oil exporters are a relatively
small  amount  of  total  Sub-Saharan  requirements, however, the  reduction  in  their  financing
requirements as a result of their higher export revenues would not offset the larger requirements of
the other countries caused by higher oil prices.
j4/  This analysis  is based on price and income elasticities  calculated for 1973-88  for all Sub-Saharan
oil-importing  countries in aggregate. On the basis of a simple regression, the price elasticity is equal
to about -0.24 and the income elasticity is equal to about 0.74.
44Sub-regional  pretns
The aggregate projections for the region mask divergent trends in the three country groups.
Moreover, to the extent that oil exporters have financing surpluses, the aggregate requirements are
understated because surpluses in these countries are unlikely  to be given or loaned to other African
countries.
The IDA-only  countries account for over 75 percent of the total gross financing required for
the region. Their gross external financing requirements in real terms as well as a percentage of GDP,
decline until 1997, but rise afterwards as the trade gap continues to widen and debt obligations
increase, although by the end of the decade they remain at lower real levels than in 1991 (see Anzix
chart 2). The financing requirements for these countries are driven by a widening  trade deficit,  which
more than doubles in current  terms during the  1990s, rather  than by debt service.  Therefore,
substantially narrowing the requirements cannot be accomplished  by short-term solutions.  Because
exports cover less than $3 out of every $4 of exports in these countries, the export growth rate will
have to be a third higher than the import growth rate -- or 8-10  percent a year .- for a sustained
period of time to lower the nominal trade gap.  Exports would have to grow even faster in terms of
trade decline. Provided that policy  reforms are effective,  and assuming  a favorable trade environment
in the industrial countries, the trade gap may begin to narrow after the end of the decade if export
growth continues to accelerate. The reouired rates are optimistic, but they have been achieved by
successful developing countries.
For the middle-income  countries and Nigeria, the situation during the 1990s  contrasts sharply
with that of the low-income countries. Middle-income  countries account for 20 percent of the total
45requirements for the region.  Their requirements decline during the decade in real terms as well as
a percentage of GDP.  As opposed to the IDA-only countries, their requirements are not driven by
trade (they have a small trade surplus) but by debt service. Debt service obligations rise dunng the
decade  as payments for nonconcessional obligations contracted in the second half of the  1980s
become due.  Debt  relief could fill much of the financing gap of this group of countries.  If the
creditor community  granted more generous debt relief than assumed in the model, the need for new
financing would be considerably less.
Nigeria needs an average annual gross financing (before debt relief) of $2.4 billion only from
1991  to 1995. From 1996  onwards Nigeria  would generate a surplus. Nigeria's requirements decrease
because of both an increasing trade surplus and declining  debt service obligations over the decade.
After debt relief, Nigeria would need an annual average of only $1.1 billion in 1991 and 1992, as it
generates surplus after that.
Pwojected  financing sources
For illustrative purposes, prospective sources of financing for these requirements are also
shown in Table 7 and Chart 5.  The major financing sources, in order of importance, include gross
loan disbursements from  all lenders, official transfers, debt  relief  measures (net  of  additional
moratorium debt service) and direct foreign investment. (Private transfers are treated as resources,
included in the current account balance.) Gross loan disbursements,  net official transfers and direct
foreign investment are assumed to grow at annual average nominal growth rates of 3-4, 7 and 10
percent, respectively. Gross disbursements  of nonconcessional  loans are assumed to remain constant,
in nominal prices, at the 1988 level.
46The share of gross loan disbursements  and official  transfers in total financing  -- including  debt
service reduction - - is assumed to rise from 65 to 87 percent by the end of the decade.  The share
of direct foreign investment is assumed to double during the decade, although because the base is
very small its contribution to total requirements remains low (6 percent  '  , 2000). Debt relief, which
is assumed at the most favorable terms currently allowed under  the Paris Club, would gradually
dwindle and become negative by 1998 as repayment of previous debt consolidations fall due.  Two
other reasons account for the relatively  small contribution of debt relief to total financing resources:
about a fourth of Africa's debt is multilateral and currently not eligible for debt relief; and all new
borrowing is assumed ineligible for rescheduling, which is in line with the current policy on cut-off
dates.
Table 7  Prospective  sources  of financing for Sub-Saharan  Africa, 1991-2000
(annual  averages  in billions  of dollars)
of which
1991-2000  1991-95  1996-2000
Gross loan disbursements  12.1  10.8  13.3
of which concessional  7.2  6.1  8.3
Official transfers  10.0  8.4  11.6
Direct foreign investment  1.5  1.1  1.9
Debt relief a/  1.7  3.9  -0.4
Residual gap  2.9  3.3  2.5
Total financing  28.2  27.5  28.9
Source: World Bank projections
a/  Net of moratorium debt service on rescheduled debt.
Under this scenario, only about 90 percent of the requirements would be met, indicating the
need for stronger reforms, export promotion, more efficient use of imports, and additional resources -
- namely more favorable debt relief and larger caphial  inflows,  especially from the private sector.
47The purpose  of this paper is to discuss  the magnitude  of external  resources  that Sub-Saharan
Africa  may  require  during  the !9Os, and not the likelihood  of obtaining  those resources. However,
the figures  presented  in this  paper for the various  financing  components  are in line  with magnitudes
projected  by other papers  prepared  for the World  Bank  Symposium  on African  Extemal  Finance  in
the 1990s,  whose  purpose  was to indicate  the prospects  for external  financing  from  various  sources,
Methodological  summary
The financing  requirements  of Sub-Saharan  Africa  were projected  in nominal  US dollars  using
a macroeconomic  accounting framework  covering  basic relationships  among aggregates  of the
macroeconomy.  (Details  are given  in the Annex) 'Te  target rates  of real GDP and export volume
growth  (about  5 percent a year)  were assumed  to be achieved  gradually  during  the 1990s,  accelerating
from the lower  levels  of the late 1980s.  Import  volumes  were set by an elasticity  of one, relative  to
real GDP growth,  which  is higher than aggregate  elasticity  manifested  in the 1980s,
48Chort  5
Financing  by  Source  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  1989-2000 (Billions  of  US dollars)
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O  Loan  disbursements
+  Official  transfers
9  Direct  foreign  investment
a  Debt  relief
X  Residual  gapwhen insufficient foreign exchange constrained imports. J/  On the other hand, the future import
elasticity may be aepected to exceed one, because of the severe compression of imports during the
1980s (import volume in 1988 was only 76 percent of the level in  1980), because of the need to
rebuild critical infrastructure and productive facilities,  and because of the need to expand basic social
services. Moreover, import intensity normally deepens as economies grow and develop.
The assumed international environment would be moderately expansive (3 percent growth in
OECD countries during the 1990s). Because of rising real oil prices (as projected before the current
Middle East crisis), terms of trade would be generally favorable for the  region overall, but  oil
importers would face slightly  declining terms of trade.
Policy reforms are  not  explicitly included in  the  model, although achieving the  targets
projected for key economic  variables assumes the adoption of conducive policies, as discussed  in the
previous section.  (Real depreciation of domestic currencies is explicitly assumed (about 3 percent
a year) because it effects how domestic prices move relative to international prices, and thus affects
ratios expressed as a percentage of domestic GDP.
X5/ In tkis paper, the import elasticity  is analogous to factor coefficients  in a supply function -- which
means that a certain quantity of imported intermediate and capital goods is needed to sustain a
related volume of GDP growth. In reality, the volume of capital and intermediate imports will also
be affected by changes in relative prices, including exchange rates, because some flexibility  exists in
production structures.
However, about half of the region's imports are consumer goods, which means that the
volume of imports will also be affected by changes in consumption (caused by changes in national
income and prices) as well as by changes in output.  Because some of these consumer goods are
financed directly by foreign transfers and loans changes in total import levels will also reflect access
to external financing, which raise national income.
Keeping the import elasticity at one during the entire decade may require significant shifts
in the composition of imports (from consumer to producer goods), especially in the effort to raise
investment levels and improve capital efficiency.
50Financing requirements are calculated as the sum of the trade gap (that is, the difference
between projected exports and imports of goods and services,  excep. interest obligations on external
debt), debt service  obligations (including  interest on short-term debt and obligations  to the IMF), and
a target increase in foreign reserves.
The relationship between the amount of investment required and the projected growth rates,
generally referred to as incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR), is assumed to improve during the
decade, with the ICOR declining from 6.8 in 1985-88  to 4.8 in 2000 for the region as a whole.  6/
Substantial changes in the ICOR would be needed for the middle-income  countries and Nigeria as
the ratio is brought down from its present level to meet the target GDP and investment levels. This
change assumes the implementation of policy reform programs that increase the efficiency  of ;apitat
No improvement of the ICOR is projected for the IDA-only countries because their eTi  hiency of
capital  already  appears  very  high, in  part  because of  the  recent  growth  resulting from  the
implementation of reform programs and higher aid in the late 1980s. However, these countries must
continue to maintain adequate policies if this efficiency is to be sustained as investment levels are
increased and focused more on infrastructure and human resource deve!opment.
L6/  In the model the single-year ICOR is calculated using the following  formula:
GDI '-  / (GDP - GDP 't),  using  prices  in t-1. The multi-year  ICOR for 1985-88  is
calculated on the basis of total investment in 1985-87  and the change in GDP between 1985
and 1988, using 1988 prices.
51Annex
The framework and assumptions for the projections
This annex describes both the general assumptions  used in the projections and those specific
to each of the country groups.  Tne first section describes the projections framework and basic
assumptions,  which apply to all groups. The subsequent sections  discuss  the specific assumptions  and
the base-case scenario for each group, as well as the sensitivity  of the results to changes in major
assumptions. The analysis  is in current and constant prices, expressed in US dollars.
The projections framework
Aid requirements were projected using an accounting frameworl.  A set of equations covers
basic relationships among aggregates of national accounts, trade flows, the balance of payments,
government finance, indebtedness and the growth of population.  Key parameters have been set in
line with  the  broad  objectives of  reform programs.  The estimates are  driven by three  basic
assumptions:  growth of aggregate GDP (with no explicit sectoral analysis),  growth of total exports,
and overall import requirements for growth as a function of the import elasticity.  The ratio of
investment to GDP determines the level of domestic consumption, when account is taken of the
projected resource gap representing the balance of external trade.  Domestic saving is a residual--
the difference between GDP and consumption.
52Continuing policy reforms are implicit in the projections, as their impact on performance is not
modeled directly. However, an assumed change in the real exchange rate affects the relative level
of domestic prices, measured in US dollars, which influences results in current prices. A/ Assumed
changes in government revenue and spending also affect the shares of private consumption and
saving.
Financing requirements are projected using aggregate data for each group of countries, which
allows for the probability that some countries will do better than the average and some worse. Any
country individually  may differ from the "average"  assumptions,  and its requirements may differ from
its prorata share of the total for the group.
Basic assumptions
The basic targets and assumptions are similar to those in the World Bank's recent publication
Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth.  For the region as a whole, that  report
assumed real GDP growth during the 1990s  of 4-5 percent a year, annual export volume growth of
over 5 percent, an import elasticity falling to about 1.1 by 2000, investment rising to 25 percent of
GDP, and an incremental capital output ratio declining from about 7 in 1990 to 5 by 2000.
These targets are more optimistic than historical trends for Sub-Saharan Africa overall, but
they are consistent with the historical experience of successful  countries in and out of Africa  and with
recent improvements  in reforming countries.  For example, during 1965-88,  Kenya achieved a GDP
jj  For example, real depreciation may cause the ratio of imports to GDP in current prices to rise,
assuming no offsetting fall in the volume of imports.
53growth rate of 5.7 percent a year, with an investment rate of 25 percent of GDP and an ICOR of
4.4. However, in most cases, the targets and assumptions  are less optimistic than recent or projected
results for developing countries in general.  For example, exports from all developing countries are
expected to grow at over 6 percent a year during the 1990s.
These projections use an import elasticity  of one, which represents an improvement on recent
exper.ence of many countries, although historical values are lower for some periods and countries.
Between 1967-74,  a period of relatively  good economic growth, the import elasticity  was only 0.4 for
the region, while GDP growth (excluding  Nigeria) was 4.4 percent a year. During the 1980s,  a period
of especially low growth, the elasticity was negative for African countries overall, including the
MDA-only  countries as a group.  For the 20 core countries that receive import support through the
Special Program of Assistance, the import elasticity is estimated at 0.8 for 1988-90,  a period when
annual GDP growth exceeded 4 percent.  In contrast, the elasticity  was 1.3 in 1975-80,  while annual
GDP growth was less than 2.4 percent.  However, the assumed value may be justified because of the
severe import compression in 1982-1986;  by 1988,  the volume of imports into Sub-Saharan countreis
was only 3 percent higher than before the first oil shock.
For the 20 core countries that  received import support  through the Special Program of
Assistance, the import elasticity is estimated at 0.8 for 1988-90,  a period when annual GDP growth
exceeded 4 percenL
In addition, reserves are targeted to rise gradually  to an equivalent of three months of imports
by 2000 to support plicies  to liberalize  foreign trade and exchange arrangements. By 1988,  reserves
54for all Sub-Saharan countries were equivalent to less than 1.5 months of imports and only slightly
higher for the IDA-only countries.
Prospects for the world economy are similar to those developed by the Bank for the World
Development Report  1990. The 'most likely"  scenario assumes industrial countries will grow at 3
percent a year during the 1990s. Compared to  1988-90,  the terms of trade index for Sub-Saharan
Africa (excluding Nigeria) is projected to increase slightly during the 1990s, and to improve for
Nigeria by almost 40 percent over the period.  For IDA-only countries, however, the  terms-of-trade
index will remain below its level in  1988-90,  de-clining  slightly over the decade.  Underlying this
scenario is an assumed gradual depreciation of the US dollar, especially  in the latter part of the 1990s
(from 0.78 SDR/USS in 1989 to 0.67 SDR/US$ by 2000).
Projecting aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa is made more difficult by discrepancies among
different historical series. As the projections must be consistent with other elements of the balance
of payments and national accounts, the ODA levels used as the base for projections are generally
consistent with the balance of payments of the recipients. These levels are usually lower than those
reported to the DAC by donors, which often include items that do not appear in the
55Annex chart I
Sub-Saharan Africa: Terms of trade index, 1989-2000
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O  Non-oil exporting countries of sub-Saharan Africabalance of payments. 2/  Even within a given amount of projected aid, there could be substantial
shifts among regions and  countries, and between project financing and general import support.
Emergency requirements (which are not assumed in the projections) could further alter outcomes.
These projections incorporate recent decisions  on the ninth replenishment of IDA and the fourth
Lome Convention, as well as the prognosis for bilateral aid in the OECD's 1989  report, DeveloRment
Co-operation in the 1990s.
Bilateral ODA is assumed to grow in line with nominal GNP in the OECD countries (about
7-8 percent a year, in US dollars), with the share going to sub-Saharan Africa remaining constant at
recent levels (about 32 percent in 1988,  including  unallocated disbursements  and administrative  costs),
which would be a leveling  off of the steady increase in Africa's  share of worldwide ODA in the 1980s
(since 1985, the region's share has increased by a tenth).  The allocation within Africa is implicitly
assumed to remain fairly similar to the current pattem.
IDA lending has been based on current  lending programs through the end of IDA9.  It
represents about 47 percent of total IDA, including replenishments and reflows from earlier IDA
2/  Discussions of aid flows are complicated by definitional and methodological questions and by
sometimes large differences among various data sources.  Generally in this paper, aid is defined as
gross disbursements received by individual  countries, which are recorded in the recipient countries'
balance of payments. Aid flows based on balance of payments data usually  differ from those based
on DAC reports, which are based on donors' reports, including  "off-shore"  expenditures that may  not
enter a recipent's bulance of payments. Series in constant prices are calculated using import prices,
which shows the real value of aid to the recipient. The DAC secretariat deflates by the GNP dollar
deflator of  OECD  ccuntries, which shows the value of the  aid to  the donor.  With the  latter
approach, the increase in the net ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa was about 5 percent in real terms in
1988. The share of ODA going to Sub-Saharan Africa depends on the treatment of unallocated aid.
For example, the region's share (excluding  overseas departments and territories) was  either 30 or 35
percent depending on whether unspecified aid, which is largely the donors' administrative  costs, is
excluded or included from the worldwide  total. However, regardless  of the series chosen, the region's
share of worldwide aid has steadily increased.
57credits.  Taken together, these allocations mean that the region will receive a slightly  smaller share
of IDA commitments during IDA9 than during IDA8, but in real terms the level will be about the
same.
All IDA-only countries currently without ESAFs are assumed to reach agreement on one (at
a notional 150 percent of quota) in the early 1990s. Taking account of assumed new commitments
for ESAFs, uncommitted funds remaining in the SAF and ESAF for worldwide use would amount
to about SDR 3.8 billion. No other access to IMF resources has been projected, although it is likely
that some countries may eventually have Standby or other arrangements during the 1990s.
Aid from the Commission of European Communities (CEC) has been projected (through
1993) taking into account changes negotiated in Lome4. In real terms (when deflated by Africa's
import prices), the value of Lome4 is 23 percent larger than Lome3 and commitments  should disburse
more quickly,  given the larger share of STABEX, the creation of a structural adjustment facility,  and
the possibility  of using a share of the indicative programs for quick-disbursing  assistance to support
adjustment. Lending from the African Development Fund, which accounts for three percent of ODA
to the region, is assumed to grow in line with bilateral aid; its actual growth will  depend on its fifth
replenishment in 1991.
After 1993,  total multilateral aid is assumed to grow at the same rate as bilateral aid, except
for the IMF.
In addition to aid, some inflows  of other capital are assumed, including  private investment and
transfers, limited nonconcessional borrowing,  and additional short-term credit. Short-term borrowing
58to facilitate trade is assumed to rise with nominal import growth (for the SPA countries, for example,
short-term trade credits now represents about 15 percent of the annual import bill).
Debt service obligations are projected on the basis of disbursed commitments at the end of
1988 (which were the most recent data  reported by debtors through the World Bank's Debtor
Reporting System) plus projected new disbursements (from both existing and expected additional
commitments) after 1988. The obligations cover all debt, including commercial  bank debt, the IMF,
and short-term trade credits. Debt service obligations include moratorium interest and amortization
due on all official  rescheduling arrangements agreed or expected to be agreed through 1990. (Debt
service obligations on subsequent reschedulings  are subtracted from debt relief resulting from these
reschedulings,  which is shown on a net basis.) Arrears to official  bilateral creditors are assumed to
be rescheduled.
Debt relief results from forgiveness and rescheduling of official bilateral loans (both direct
and guaranteed) and from rescheduling or other reduction of private debt. 3/ Official concessional
debt owed to  Paris Club creditors is assumed to be mostly cancelled in line with existing donor
programs (reducing obligations on this debt by about three-quarters); debt service on the remaining
concessional debt  is assumed to  be partly rescheduled (three-fifths) and partly paid (two-fifths),
reflecting in part the practice of some donors of providing  special grants in lieu of forgiveness. Other
bilateral  concessional debt  is  assumed  to  be  rescheduled  in  countries  with  any  Paris  Club
arrangement. Rescheduling would be on concessional terms (25 years maturity with 14 years grace
and interest no higher than the original loans).
3/  Private debt consists of medium- and long-term loans owed to commercial  creditors by, or with
the guarantee of, the debtor government, but which are not otherwise guaranteed, collateralized, or
secured by creditor governments, by other third parties, or by assets.
59Rescheduling of official bilateral debt is assumed to continue broadly in line with recent
agreements with Paris Club and other creditors.  With some exceptions noted below, countries are
assumed to reschedule annually (either through yearly meetings of the Paris Club or within some
multi-year framework).  There  would be  no cha  v  in  the cut-off dates  in each  country, and
consolidation of previously rescheduled debt would continue only where this is already established
practice. As a result, debt service obligations  on obligations rescheduled under the Toronto options
would not be rescheduled again. Obligations arising from any new borrowings  after the cutoff date
are considered ineligible for rescheduling, although for the IDA-only countries, most of these will
already be largely on highly concessional terms.  In addition to rescheduling through the Loedon
Club, some reduction of commercial  debt is assumed, through some combination of buybacks  at deep
discounts, swaps and other arrangements.
IDA-only countries
In line with the targets of the long term strategy, annual growth of aggregate GDP for the
group would rise from 3.3 percent ira  1985-88 to 4.3 percent in 1995, reaching 5 percent by 2000.
Imports would grow at a slightly faster pace (0.1-0.2 percentage points) than GDP.  Annual growth
of aggregate exports for the group would be higher than GDP growth, averaging 5 percent during
the 1990s,  which is 1.5 percentage points above the 1985-88  rate.  Gross domestic investment would
be expected to rise steadily from 15 percent of GDP to 25 percent by 2000, which would result in an
implicit ICOR (in constant prices) of 4.5 in 1995 and 4.8 in 2000.
60The assumptions  lead to an increasing  openness, in line with assumed trade Uberalization  measures
and continued real currency depreciation.  Imports (of goods and nonfactor services) rise from 26
percent of GDP in 1985488  to over a third of GDP in 1995 and to over 40 percent of GDP by 2000.
Exports rise as well, from less than a fifth of GDP in the late 1980s  to 28 percent by 2000. These
assumptions are consistent with the historical experience of successful developing countries.  The
volume of exports from all low and middle income countries grew at 6.2 percent a year during 1980-
88. g/  For  many countries,  the share  of  .xports in  GDP  is already greater  than  a  third (for
example, in 1987,  it was 64 percent in Malaysia,  45 percent in Korea, 34 percent in Cote d'Ivoire and
Chile, and 30 percent in Thailand).
Import prices are expected to rise faster than export prices (4.8 percent a year over 1988-90  levels,
compared with 4.2 percent for exports), resulting in a 0.6 percent deterioration a year in the terms
of trade over the entire decade.
Financing and debt relief for 1988-90,  which constitute the base for projecting levels in the
1990s,  were calculated for two subgroups: the SPA countries and other IDA-only countries.  In the
SPA countries, this base represents results expected under SPAI.  In the group of other IDA-only
countries, the volume of capital inflows  was assumed to continue the flat trend of 1985-88,  and debt
service payments  were assumed to remain at 1988 levels  with further accumulation  of arrears in 1989-
90.
d/  Some of the better  performers include: Botswana, 20.2 percent a year; Korea,  13.2 percent;
Thailand, 11.6 percent; Mauritius, 9.6 percent; Malaysia,  9.5 percent; and Zimbabwe, 6.2 percent.
61The growth rate of ODA from all sources, in constant OECD prices and exchange rates, would
decline from about 4.2 percent a year in 1988-90  to an average of 1.9 percent a year in 1991-2000,
reflecting the large pipeline of commitments in the late 1980s  and normative assumptions about new
aid flows in the 1990s,  from various donors, as described above.  ODA accounts for all but about a
tenth of gross external financing,  with an overall grant element of about 90 percent (three-fifths of
ODA is assumed to be outright grants). All World Bank and IMF financing would be concessional.
The results also indicate, however, a deepening dependence on external financing.  As a share of
GDP, ODA rises from less than 11 percent in 1985-88  to over 14 percent throughout the 1990s.
The bulk of this foreign capital would finance investment.
An improved investment  climate, including market liberalization and better public sector support,
is expected to increase direct foreign investment by about 5 percent a year in the 1990s. Even with
this  change  the  contribution  of  this  source  remains  marginal.  Disbursements  from  new
nonconcessional loans are  expected to  remain constant in  nominal prices at  $1 billion a year
throughout the decade.  Shor. .erm credits for trade financing are projected to grow about half as
fast as the value of imports.
62Annex  chart  2
IDA-only  countries:  Gross  financing  requirements,  1989-2000
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V  Change  in  reservesRegarding debt  relief, most  ODA  loans are  assumed to  be  cancelled, but  some would be
rescheduled and a few paid, as explained  above. Nonconcessional  bilateral debt would be rescheduled
during the  1990s  on Toronto terms, in line with established patterns.  :/  Debt service payments
on  existing medium  and  long-term commercial bank  debt  owed  or  guaranteed  by  recipient
governments are assumed to correspond to recent trends (only some countries service a portion of
this debt).
Policy reforms are assumed to continue, including a steady real exchange rate depreciation
of 3.4 percent a year and a gradual (two percentage points between 1988 and 2000) increase in
government revenues and decrease in government expenditures.
For the 29 IDA-only  countries, the assumed  domestic growth, changes  in terms of trade, and debt
relief lead to a rising real level of gross national income.  On a per capita basis, gross national
income would rise at 1 percent a year in 1991-95  and at about 1.6 percent a year for the rest of the
decade.  In 1988  dollars,  however, gross national income would only be about $253 a person in 1991-
95, an increase of only 1.5 percent over its level in 1985-90. Consumption per capita would barely
rise in 1991-95  (as it did in 1984-88)  but would grow at over 1 percent year for the rest of the decade.
The private share of GDP would remain about the same over the period.
:/  Most countries are assumed to reschedule obligations on debt contracted before the cutoff date
and on previously rescheduled debt that has already been included in Paris Club agreements.  For
Burundi, the Gambia and Ghana, no rescheduling is assumed because their bilateral nonconcessional
debt is small and the gains from Paris Club rescheduling would be small. For Kenya, to protect its
access to  limited commercial borrowing, no rescheduling is assumed.  In  practice, some other
countries, notably Chad and Malawi, may not  reschedule because further gains would be small;
however, for this reason, there would be no appreciable change in projected aggregate debt relie.f
65Annex table 1  IDA-only countries:  Key  economic indicators,  1985-88,  1995, 2000
(average annual percentage change unless otherwise indicated otherwise)
1985-88  1995  2000
Domestic indicators
Real gross domestic product (GDP)  3.3  4.3  5.0
Real gross domestic investment (GDI)  4.9  9.4  5.8
GDI (percent of GDP)  15.1  20.5  25.0
Gross domestic savings (Percent of GDP)  7.6  9.7  11.9
Real consumption per capita  0.1  0.1  1.4
Real gross national income (GNY)  3.4  4.7  4.9
Real GNY per capita (1988 US$)  248.0  259.0  280.0
Real  effective exchange  rate  ..  -3.4  -3.4
ICOR (1988, 1994, 1999  prices respectively)  4.5  4.5  4.8
Trade indicators and official development assistance
Import elasticity  1.3  1.0  1.0
Import volume  4.4  4.4  5.0
Imports (percent of GDP)  25.8  34.2  41.1
Export volume  3.5  4.8  5.9
Exports (percent of GDP)  18.2  23.4  28.0
Import prices  3.4  4.6  6.1
Export prices  1.6  6.0  4.8
Terms of trade index (1988=100)  96.7  95.7  92.3
Real gross ODA  12.6  3.3  1.0
Gross ODA (percent of GDP)  10.8  14.2  14.6
Debt service indicators before debt relief
Debt  service ratio (percent  of  exports)  ..  27.8  16.2
Debt  service (percent  of GDP)  ..  6.7  4.7
Sources: World Bank data and projections.
66Annae table 2  IDA-Oy  countriew  Financing  and debt relie£ 1954,  1995,  2000
(average annual  tcent  of GDP unless otherwise indicated)
1985-88  1995  2000
Total foreign financing required
US$ billion  10.0  20.1  27.8
percent of GDP  13.5  18.8  19.0
Gross inflows  13.4  15.7  15.9
Net debt relief  - 1.8  0.1
Residual financing gap  0.1  1.3  3.0
Memo items:
Debt service indicators after debt relief
Debt service ratio (percent of exports)  28.6  20.4  15.8
Debt service  5.3  4.9  4.6
Sources: World Bank data and projections.
67Nigeria
The size of Nigeria's economy and the large share of oil in its export receipts justify discussing
its financing needs separately from other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Growth of production would gradually accelerate from 1.9 percent a year in 1985-1988  to 3.9
percent in 1995 and 5 percent in 2000.  Export growth is projected to be much lower, however - -
at 2 percent  a year, because growth in the volume of oil exports is expected to  be  Umited by
diminishing  reserves and growing  domestic demand. The volume of imports would grow at the same
rate as output in the 1990s,  because of the assumed import elasticity of one.
Import prices are projected to rise at a considerably  slower rate (4.2 percent a year between 1988
and 2000) than export prices (7.5 percent a year for the same period), reflecting the expected rise
in oil prices (as projected before the Middle East crisis). The large improvement in the second half
of the decade, would offset the faster growth of imports, and the small initial trade surplus would
grow.
Investment as a share of GDP would almost double by 1995  (from 11 percent in 1985-88  to about
20 percent) and reach 25 percent in 2000, and over half of this may  be private.  Efficiency  of the new
capital would also double by 1995 and then remain constant in 1996-2000.
68Annex chart 4
Nigeria: Gross financing  requirements.  1989-2000
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I  Change  in  reservesThe outcome from the initial conditions and normative targets would be a surplus in the balance
of goods and non-factor services.  Thus external financing is required to cover the deficit on the
services account, including interest obligations, loan amortization  obligations, and the net outqow of
private transfer until they vanish by 2000. Assumptions  for concessional  and nonconcessional  capital
flows are the same as for the IDA-only countries.
Debt service obligations  on official  non-concessional  bilateral debt are assumed to be rescheduled
on Toronto terms from 1991 (assuming equal shares of debt are covered by the three options).
71Annex table 3  Nigeria: Key economic  indicators,  1985-88,  1995, 2000
(average annual percentage change unless otherwise indicated)
1985-88  1995  2000
Domestic indicators
Real gross domestic product (GDP)  1.9  3.9  5.0
Real gross domestic investment (GDI)  -24.4  9.4  11.1
GDI (percent of GDP)  10.6  19.9  25.0
Gross domestic savings (Percent of GDP)  12.8  27.3  34.7
Real consumption per capita  -3.3  -0.1  1.1
Real gross national income (GNY)  -9.2  3.9  6.5
Real GNY per capita (1988 US$)  296.0  274.0  318.0
Real  effective  exchange  rate  ..  -3.0  -3.0
ICOR (1988, 1994, 1999 prices respectively)  9.6  4.8  4.8
Trade indicators and official development assistance
Import elasticity  -10.2  1.0  1.0
Import volume  -19.0  3.9  5.0
Imports (percent of GDP)  18.7  33.4  38.9
Export volume  2.4  2.7  0.8
Exports (percent of GDP)  21.0  40.8  48.6
Import prices  8.6  3.9  4.1
Export prices  -15.5  3.4  8.9
Terms of trade index (1988=100)  146.5  117.2  146.2
Real gross ODA  18.0  4.0  2.9
Gross ODA (percent of GDP)  0.0  0.4  0.5
Debt service indicators before debt relief
Debt  service ratio (percent  of  exports)  ..  19.4  7.2
Debt service (percent  of GDP)  ..  7.8  3.5
Sources: World Bank data and projections.
72Annex  table 4  Nigeria: Fmancing and debt relie£ 195-88,  1995,  2000
(average annual percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
1985-88  1995  2000
Total foreign financing required
US$ billion  1.1  1.1  -2.6
percent of GDP  3.7  2.7  4.9
Gross inflows  5.1  4.6  4.6
Net debt relief  ..  0.5  -2.6
Residual financing gap  -1.5 a/  -2.4  -6.9
Memo items:
Debt service indicators after debt relief
Debt service ratio (percent of exports)  25.7  18.2  12.6
Debt service  5.1  7.4  6.1
a/  Including statistical discrepancy.
Sources: World Bank data and projections.
Selected IBRD borrowers
Projections for this group are based on data for four countries: Cameroon, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire
and Zimbabwe. Other  middle-income  countries were not considered because they are too small to
affect the results (Seychelles and Swaziland)  or are not expected to need special balance-of-payments
support (Botswana, Gabon and Mauritius). Because these countries have fairly  different economies,
each was analyzed separately. In the case of Cameroon and the Congo, oil and non-oil exports were
projected separately, with limits on oil production based on known deposits and reasonable capacity
utilization.
The GDP of this group of countries grew more slowly  in 1985-1988  (1.4 percent a year) than for
the other groups of countries, largely because of increasingly  damaging policy distortions, but they
73are assumed to  reach the same target  growth rate  by 2000 as other  groups of countries.  The
economies of these countries are more open than those of the other groups the groups (exports and
imports to GDP were above 30 and 26 percent, respectively,  in 1985-1988),  and their export structure
is more diversified. Given an import elasticity of one, total imports are assumed to grow faster than
exports.  The share of both exports and imports to GDP would increase gradually, but the share of
net exports would narrow from 4 per cent in 1985-1988  to 2.5 percent in 1995 and 2.3  percent in
2000 because of slow increase in the exports of crude oil.
74Annex  chart  6
S,lected  IBRD  borrowerst  Gross  financing  requirements.  1989-2000
(Billions  of  US  dollars)
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*  Change  in  reservesBecause of t1heir  broader trade composition, the terms of trade for this group would be less
volatile than for ch&other groups, and is projected to improve moderately with export and import
prices increasirg smoothly at 5.1 and 4.8 percent a year, respectively.
Investment as a share of GDP would rise from 18 per cent in 1985-1988,  to 22 and 25 percent in
1995  and 2000, respectively,  with the efficiency  gadually  reaching about 20 percent by 2000. Real per
capita consumption would increase only in the second half of the decade and by 2000 would be  15
percent lower than in 1984-88.
The resource balance would remain positive for the 1990s,  averaging above $1.1 billion a year.
The outflow of private transfers, which was about $700 million in 1987-88  would gradually decline
and disappear in 2000. Grants to finance investment -starting from a low level -would double during
the  decade.  Real  ODA would increase slowly. Non-concessional loans are assumed to  remain
constant, in nominal prices, at 1988 levels. Direct foreign investment would increase at an average
annual rate of 5 percent during the 1990s.
Debt service ratios, after debt rescheduling, for this group of countries were the highest in the
region in 1988 (at 48 percent) they would  decline to about !  per cent in 1995 and 29 percent in
2000. It was assumed that official bilateral debt would be resche. jled on Toronto terms, easing the
pressure in the early years of the 1990s. The financing gap would grow from 4.8 percent of GDP in
1991-95  to 5.2 percent in 1996-2000. The gap is wider than in any other group.
77pressure in the early years of the 1990s. The financing  gap would grow from 4.8 percent of GDP in
1991-95  to 5.2  percent in 1996-2000. The gap is wider than in any other group.
78Annex table 5  Selected IBRD borrowers:  Key economic indicators, 19154  1995,  2000
(average annual percentage change, unless othermise indicated)
1985-88  1995  2000
Domestic indicators
Real gross domestic product (GDP)  1.4  3.4  5.0
Rea! q-oss domestic investment (GDI)  -6.5  6.2  7.9
GD.  vper' -nt of GDP)  17.8  21.8  25.0
Gross domestic savings (Percent of GDP)  21.8  24.3  27.3
Real consumption per capita  -0.7  -0.1  1.2
Real gross national income (GNY)  -3.2  3.3  5.5
Real GNY per capita (1988 US$)  963.0  796.0  861.0
Real effective exchange rate  ..  -3.0  -3.0
ICOR (1988, 1994, 1999 prices respectively)  14.3  6.2  4.9
Trade indicators and official development assistance
Import elasticity  -2.2  1.0  1.0
Import volume  -3.0  3.5  5.0
Imports (percent of GDP)  26.2  29.6  34.6
Export volume  -1.3  1.8  4.1
Exports (percent of GDP)  30.2  32.1  36.9
Import prices  8.6  5.5  4.8
Export prices  -0.3  4.9  5.7
Terms of trade index (1988=100)  111.4  102.8  106.8
Real gross ODA  12.0  2.0  2.2
Gross ODA (percent of GDP)  1.7  2.1  2.2
Debt service indicators before debt relief
Debt service ratio (percent of  exports)  ..  33.4  25.2
Debt service (percent of GDP)  ..  10.6  9.5
…----------------  -…  - . . ........................................................................................
Sources:  World Bank data and projections.
79Annes  table 6  Selectd  IBRD  borrowers: Fnancing and debt reliet  19858,  1995, 2300
(average  annual percent  of GDP,  unless otherwise  indicated)
1985-88  1995  2000
Total foreign financing required
USS billion  3.6  5.3  6.8
Percent  of GDP  12.6  3.7  12.9
Gross inflows  10.8  9.2  8.2
Net debt relief  ..  0.2  -1.0
Residual  financing gap  1.8 a/  4.3  5.7
Memo items:
Debt service indicators  after debt relief
Debt service ratio (percent  of exports)  40.4  32.6  29.0
Debt service  12.1  10.3  10.5
a/  Includes  statistical discrepancy.
Sources:  World Bank data and projections.
80Simplified  algebraic  description  of the model
Variables are dollar-denominated.
Real magnitudes, indicated by #, are expressed at constant 1988 prices.
Simulations cover period 1988 - 2000.
Indices are derived from dollar-denominated variables with 1988 as a base year.
The upper-case suffix t denotes the time period.
Variables indicated by an @ are exogenous.
National accounts equations:
I.  @GDP#  = GDP#'-'  t (1  +  rGDP)
II.  @X#Oil =  X#*il  (1 +  rxoi 1)
III.  @)X*non-oil  X#nono  r  (1 +xon-ol)
IV.  X# = X#oi + X#non-oil
V.  @M# =  M#tll  (1  +  aM ° rGDP)
VI.  @PGDP =  PRER  PM
VII.  GDP  =  GDP#  I  PGDP
VIII.  GDI  a, * GDP  !/
It  X  X# I Px
X.  M =M#  PM
XI.  C =GDP  - GDI - X + M
XII.  ODS = GDI  + (X - M)
§/  From variables defined in formulas 6-8, the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR), based on
investment in period t-l and the change in GDP at t-l year prices, can be calculated as follows:
ICOR  = GDI1I' / [(GDP  * PGDPt  / PGDP) - GDP"].
81XIII.  GNP = GDP - NFY + DRI
XIV.  GNS  = GDS - NFY  + DRI  + NPT
XV.  PDA  (GDP +  M - X) / (GDP#  + M# - X#)
Xvi  C#  -C  /P1>A
XVII.  GDI#  =GDP#  - C#  - X#  + M#
XVIII.  GNP#  =  GNP / PGDP
XIX  @PTOT  =  Px / PM
XX.  ToTAdj#  =  (priT-  1) * X#
XXI.  GNY#  = GNP#  + ToTAdj#
Balance-of-payments  equations:
XXII.  Xgnrs  aXRT  X
XXIII.  Mgnts  aMRT  M
XXIV.  Nonlnt  =  Nonlnttl  v' (I  +  rNonln)  PGDP  / PGDP
XXV.  NFY =  INT +  Nonlnt
XXVI.  @NPT =  NPT'  (I  +  rN)T)  *  PMUJV  / PMuvt
XXV1I.  @NOT  NOT"'  (I  +  rNOT)  POECDGDP  / POECDGDP"I
XXVIIT.  @DFI =  DFIt- 1  (I  +  rDFI)  PMUV  / PMULV
XXIX.  @STD  STD)''  *  (I  +  [(1 +  aM * rGDP)  PM  / PM  11aST
XXX.  NDST  =  STD  - STD''
XXXI.  R =  aR  Mgns i 12
XXXII.  ChR  =  R - R'
XXXIII.  DS = INT + AMT
X;XIV.  GAP = Mgn 8 s - Xgnfs  + Nonlnt  - NPT - NOT - DFI - GDMLT +  DS - NDST + ChR
82List of symbols:
a,  Share of investment in GDP, exogenous
aM  Elasticity of imports relative to GDP growth, exogenous
aMRT  Constant, exogenous adjustment between the imports of goods and non-factor services  in the
system of national accounts and balance of payments
aR  Target level of international reserves to finance imports defined as months of coverage,
exogenous
asr  Elasticity of short-term debt stock relative to import growth, exogenous
aXRT  Constant, exogenous adjustment between the exports of goods ancl  non-factor services  in the
system of national accounts and balance of payments
AMT  Scheduled amortization obligations of medium- and long-term debt, exogenous
C  Consumption
ChR  Changes in reserves
DFI  Net direct foreign investment
DRI  Reduction in interest obligations through debt relief, net of moratorium interest
DS  Scheduled debt sZrvice  obligations
GAP  Residual financing gap before debt relief
GDI  Gross domestic investment
GDMLT  Gross disbursements of medium- and long-term loans,
eogenous
GDP  Gross domestic product
GDS  Gross domestic savings
GNP  Gross national product after debt relief
GNS  Gross national savings  after debt relief
83GNY  Gross national  income  after debt relief
INT  Scheduled  interest  obligations  of short-, medium-  and long-term  debt,
exogenous
M  Imports  of goods  and non-factor  services  (national  account
definition)
Mgnfs  Imports  of goods  and non-factor  services  (balane-of-payments
definition)
NDST  Net disbursements  of short-term  loans
NFY  Obligations  of net factor income  to abroad
Nonlnt  Non-interest  net factor service  payments
NOT  Net official  transfer  receipts
NPT  Net private  transfer  receipts
PDA  Deflator  of domestic  absorption
PoDP  GDP deflator index
PM  Import price index merchandise goods (country/group specific),
exogenous
PMuW  Unit value index  of imported manufactured  goods (based on G-5 exports to sub-Saharan  Africa),
exogenous
POECDCNP  GNP deflator of OECD countries (approximated  by the average USS deflator for the G-5
countries),  exogenous
PRER  Real excilange  rate (S/local  currency)  index,  exogenous
PTOT  Terms of trade index
Px  Export price index, exogenous
R  Value of intemational reserves
rDFI  Real growth rate of direct foreign investment,  exogenous
rGDp  Real growth rate of GDP, exogenous
rNonlni  Real growth rate of non-interest net factor service payments, exogenous
rNOT  Real growth  rate of net official  transfer  payment  receipts,  exogenous
84rNV1r  Real growth rate of net private transfer receipts, exogenous
rxan  o  {  Real growth rate of non-oil exports of goods and non-factor services, exogenous
rxoi  Real gromwth  rate of oil exports, exogenous
STD  Short-term debt
ToTAdj  Gain or loss of national income resulting from terms-of-trade changes
X  Exports of goods and non-factor services  (national account definition)
Xgnfs  Exports of goods and non-factor services  (balance-of-payments  definition)
Xnon-oil  Non-oil exports of goods and non-factor services
XOd  lOil  exports
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